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Transnational Institution Building as Public-Private Interaction 
– The Case of Standard Setting on the Internet and in 
Corporate Financial Reporting
Sebastian Botzem and Jeanette Hofmann1
Abstract 
This article sets out to compare processes of formal institution building in two 
transnational policy areas, the regulation of the Internet infrastructure and the regulation of 
corporate financial reporting. Both cases are concerned with regulatory arrangements 
beyond the nation state, in which standards are sought to reduce the uncertainty that actors 
face when interacting at the transnational level. The article focuses on changing actor 
constellations, arguing in favour of dynamic conceptions of transnational regulation and 
rule-making. Both cases demonstrate that the creation of regulatory institutions such as 
standards, codes or contracts is a dynamic and interactive process that involves both public 
and private actors. Based on a comparison of the regulatory arrangements we specify 
various phases of transnational institution-building and we suggest three mechanisms that 
help explain the observed institutional changes. Both cases illustrate that transnational 
regulatory institutions do not only reduce uncertainty, they also contribute to the creation 
of new forms of uncertainty. 
Introduction: transnational institution-building 
A core challenge in the transnational space concerns the lack of an institutional order that 
would provide relevant actors with clear rules and norms. This paper centres on two broad 
efforts to create a regulatory framework with a globally accepted rule setting authority. 
While both fields, communication networks and corporate financial reporting, have a long 
history of national regulation, today they epitomize the dynamics and modes of trans-
border integration. The following comparison of the two fields has been inspired by and 
focuses on the somewhat puzzling relationship between public and private actors. The 
observed changes allude to developments beyond the generalized accounts of deregulation 
and re-regulation. More specifically, we were interested in patterns of change and 
mechanisms explaining these dynamics. 
The emergence of social institutions has been described as a response to uncertainty. 
Broadly defined, uncertainty characterizes situations in which actors don’t know what is 
best to do because they cannot predict the outcome of their actions (Beckert 1996: 804). 
The relevance of institutions such as norms, values or formal rules reflects the fact that 
uncertainty constitutes a more or less constant companion in modern life. In the economic 
tradition, institutions are assumed to reduce uncertainty by restricting choice and at the 
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same time providing information about the likely behavior of others (Dequech 2006). 
Institutions are conceptualized as efficient ‘behavioral regulators’ that decrease transaction 
costs by rendering social action more predictable (Boin 2008: 88; see also Power 2007: 6). 
Sociologists also study institutions against the background of uncertainty but emphasize 
their role in shaping reciprocal expectations and interests, and thereby creating credibility 
and legitimacy (Beckert 1996: 827; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). In this tradition, 
institutions are portrayed as norms or shared mental models that induce ‘appropriate’ 
action. They reduce uncertainty by providing frames of meaning that reflect broader 
cultural environments (Hall and Taylor 1996: 949). Formal institutions such as laws, rules, 
codes of conducts and standards are particularly relevant in the field of governance and 
policy studies both at the domestic and the cross-border level. International institutions 
have been defined ‘as stable sets of constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms or rules’ 
that are anchored in the expectations of relevant actors (Duffield 2007: 7-8; Senge 2007). 
They may assume a constitutive function in the sense that they ‘create social entities 
(actors) and determine their very capabilities and other endowments related to action, such 
as rights’ (Duffield 2007: 12). To the extent that international institutions create new forms 
of cross-border authority, they help reduce the ambiguity and uncertainty emanating from 
globalization processes (Grande 2006). This article focuses on the creation of regulatory 
institutions that govern transnational interactions (see Streeck and Thelen 2005: 9). More 
precisely, we look at the changing actor constellations that are part of the institution-
building process. 
Transnational relationships are defined as interactions ‘across state boundaries when at 
least one actor is not an agent of a government or an intergovernmental organization’ (Nye 
and Keohane 1971: 332). Transnational or cross-border policy fields form particularly 
interesting areas for studying the emergence of formal institutions since compared to 
national jurisdictions they show a considerably higher level of ‘disorder and uncertainty’ 
(Stone 2008). Weak hierarchies, unclear responsibilities, shifting “voluntary-legal divides” 
(Sahlin-Andersson 2004: 151) and blurring boundaries between regulators and regulated 
entities are seen as typical elements of transnational policy arrangements. 
Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations thus interact under conditions of 
changing, often fragmented, sometimes even competing forms of authority and decision-
making procedures. In the face of rising levels of international interdependence, the lack of 
a global constitution and of comprehensive regulatory regimes creates a demand for 
institutions able to facilitate trans-border activities. Private, formal institutions such as 
standards, contracts or codes of conducts have become widespread means of ordering the 
global sphere below the intricate negotiation of international treaties, conventions and 
intergovernmental standard setting (Haufler 2000). 
There is currently a variety of definitions of rules, norms, and standards. Braithwaite and 
Drahos (2000), for example, propose understanding rules to mean precise codes of 
behaviour; standards, as a yardstick by which to appraise behaviour or performance; and 
norms, as a generic term for rules, principles, standards, and guidelines. Because the exact 
distinction between norms, standards, and rules is not central to the argument of our text, 
we are going to use these terms synonymously. The important aspect in our opinion is that 
standards and norms can be of both a technical and social nature and that they are, contrary 
to what is frequently stated, not necessarily voluntary (see also Brunsson and Jacobsson 
2000). 
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In political science, the emergence of private formal institutions has been discussed against 
the background of observed changes in statehood. ‘Governance without government’ 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), self-regulation and soft law became catchy phrases to refer 
to the changing division of labour between government, business and society (Graz and 
Nölke 2008; Mörth 2004; Kahler and Lake 2003; Hall and Biersteker 2002). At first, the 
shift from public to private forms of authority was predominantly interpreted as a decline 
of public institutions such as the Westphalian order with its principle of national 
sovereignty and related forms of political legitimacy. The state, once the guarantor of 
collective and individual security, appeared to shrink to a primus inter pares or even 
vanish altogether.  
To the degree that private institutions effectively exert authority, they have been 
characterized as alternatives to public institutions such as legal rules (Kerwer 2005: 611; 
Arts 2003; Cutler, Porter and Haufler 1999). Pattberg (2005: 593) portrays them as 
functional equivalent to international governance: ‘Similar to regimes established by states, 
private institutions might provide goods, reduce transaction costs, and decrease 
uncertainty’. In a similar vein, Genschel (1995) suggests conceptualizing standards as a 
horizontal form of coordination that partly replaces public hierarchy. 
In the past few years, however, the diagnosis of an eroding nation-state has been qualified 
by a more differentiated understanding. Recent empirical work on transnational 
governance arrangements shows that the intensity and density of international regulation 
are distinctly escalating, not declining (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Governments 
are not disappearing from the international stage but rather changing their roles (for 
Internet regulation see Drezner 2007). To describe this process, Jordana and Levi-Faur 
(2004) avail themselves of Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992: 11) metaphor of steering and 
rowing: ‘While the state is responsible for steering, civil society took over the functions of 
service provision and enterprise’. Even though governments are not always directly 
involved in negotiating regulations, they continue to have a prominent part in it. ‘Since 
they retain residual rights to enact policy – to regulate business practices, to licence new 
plants, to tax corporations – states are a feature of the bargaining process’ (Kahler and 
Lake 2003: 427). 
Despite the transformation of public-private relationships, the shadow of public hierarchy 
remains an important element of private institution-building (Haufler 2003). Multi-
stakeholders processes in which government, business, and society work together in 
varying combinations are described as a characteristic feature of new modes of 
transnational governance (Biersteker and Hall 2002; Haufler 2003: 232). Meanwhile, a 
number of proposals for categorizing such transnational forms of coordination have been 
forwarded. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002: 53), for instance, distinguish between four kinds of 
interaction of public and private actors: ‘interfering regulation’ and ‘interventionist’ 
regulation as hierarchical forms of regulation, and ‘regulated self-regulation’ and ‘self-
regulation’ as cooperative and private forms of governance. 
As we wish to show in this article, the weakness of this categorization and similar ones is 
not their failure to capture the relevant practices of coordination. Instead, conceptual 
problems arise from their lack of dynamic perspective. The relations between public 
hierarchy and private self-organization are not static but subject to perpetual negotiation so 
that regulatory arrangements are in constant flux. This observation leads us to address the 
following questions about the interrelation between private and public authority: Firstly, do 
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the transformations of regulatory arrangements exhibit recognizable patterns? Secondly, 
how may we characterize the related actor constellations? Thirdly, are there any 
mechanisms able to explain the transformations in both fields? 
In this contribution we compare two prominent cases of transnational self-regulation. 
While both communication infrastructures and corporate financial reporting show long 
traditions of national regulation, they are today regarded as prime examples of 
transnational coordination. As Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002: 42) note, both areas are 
characterized by a salient gap between economic and political integration. The speed with 
which cross-border markets have emerged, has left public regulation behind and allowed 
self-regulatory processes to fill this gap. However, both cases also vary according to the 
specific conditions of the respective fields and the actors involved. Our comparative 
approach reflects the assumption that that ‘the crucial variation may no longer be among 
different states and their domestic realm, but between different transgovernmental and non-
governmental networks, their internal configurations, and their unique domestic and 
international context’ (Orenstein and Schmitz 2006: 17; see also Dingwerth 2007: 191). 
The first case study deals with the regulation of the Internet’s infrastructure by setting rules 
for the registration of domain names and for the allocation of Internet addresses (IP 
numbers). A model originally developed by the US government provided for complete 
delegation and privatization of the allocation of Internet addresses. A private company was 
entrusted with the task of establishing a contract network with all participating actors to 
reduce uncertainty induced by conflicts over property rights on domain names. But the 
early optimism about the ability of Internet users and operators to self-organize and agree 
on clear rules waned after a few years. Doubts about the clout and legitimacy of private 
authority soon led to reforms. Since then, the question of the appropriate relation between 
private and public regulatory supervision has become a subject of an international 
discussion, suggesting that the model of private self-regulation may become embedded 
more firmly in an international framework. 
The second case study traces the inception of transnational private standards for the 
preparation of corporate financial reports. Conceived three decades ago as an association-
based, initially voluntary harmonization project dominated by experts as an alternative to 
national regulations, an assertive private organization emerged whose standards have 
spread to almost the entire world. The development of the once voluntary standardization 
project is characterized on the one hand by an increasing integration of important, even 
critical actors, and on the other hand, it perceptibly ties in with public hierarchy, especially 
where transnational standards have been accepted. 
Whereas the early phase of Internet governance and the setting of international accounting 
standards seemed to bear out the thesis that state regulatory authority was declining, today 
the debate is more differentiated. In both cases governments practise what Knill and 
Lehmkuhl call ‘interfering regulation’, meaning that public interests are emphasized, as are 
specific public resources and institutions such as legitimation and legal recognition, on 
which private regulatory initiatives ultimately depend (see Genschel and Zangl 2007). The 
mutual dependence between private and governmental actors in transnational institution-
building provides an empirically observable swing between private and public dominance 
in governance arrangements. In other words, our comparison contradicts the widespread 
presumption that changes in governance structures are taking place linearly as a process of 
either privatization or, recently, ‘re-regulation’ (Vogel 1996). The comparison 
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demonstrates that change is occurring as an oscillation between different forms of cross-
border norm-setting with different phases of interaction between private and public actors. 
To explain the sustained dynamics of transnational institutional change, we go back to the 
idea of causal reconstruction through mechanisms, which gains its explanatory quality 
through an ex post facto analysis. In other words, we use mechanisms as analytical tools. 
Thinking in these terms makes it possible to link initial conditions with a particular result 
(explanandum) and, hence, to facilitate causal generalizations about recurrent processes 
(Mayntz 2005: 207). Mechanisms permit statements on how, that is, through which interim 
steps, a particular result proceeds from a particular set of starting conditions (Mayntz 2005: 
208; see also Davis and Marquis 2005: 336). Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson (2006: 380) 
ascribe self-reinforcing regulatory spirals to three empirically observable mechanisms: 
‘distrust, the question of responsibility, and the search for control’. Accordingly, the 
burgeoning amount of transnational regulatory measures seems partly attributable to 
ongoing uncertainty reflecting the fragility of rules and control mechanisms as well as 
democratic shortcomings outside the nation-state (see also Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004: 
12–15). We derive the causal links described below from comparing the process dimension 
of the two cases, looking for ‘lower order mechanisms’ that enable specific but 
nevertheless general explanations (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: 16). 
On the basis of our case studies, we propose three specific mechanisms as vehicles for 
explaining the dynamics of transnational institution-building: integration and closure, 
authorization, and proceduralization. Processes of integration and closure are intended to 
reduce uncertainty by controlling access to decisions on standardization, partly in order to 
protect a profession’s inventory of knowledge and partly to assure its acceptance and 
acknowledgment beyond groups of experts. Authorization refers to governmental 
provisions leading to the recognition of private initiatives to set regulatory norms. 
Customarily, such measures of authorization are tied to conditions that can be both 
substantive and legitimating in nature. A higher level of certainty is offered to private 
standard setting bodies in exchange for political concessions. Proceduralization is what we 
call strategies that participating actors use to manage uncertainty by neutralizing conflicts 
and to gain status or legitimacy. It can be about constitutionalizing organizational 
structures or processes but also about recognizing accountability to others. In our view 
these three mechanisms help improve the understanding of global processes of institution-
building and explain the dynamic of the interaction between private and public actors. 
Origins of transnational standard-setting on the Internet and in corporate accounting 
The transnational regulation of the Internet 
International communication requires worldwide communication services such as postal 
service, telephony, and data transmission. Until a few years ago, communication services 
in most countries were run as a sovereign monopoly. International collaboration was 
confined to ensuring that autonomous national infrastructures were compatible across 
frontiers. International cooperation, in turn, was organized as an intergovernmental 
process. An organization of the United Nations (UN), the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), saw to the cross-border operation of telephony networks (Cowhey 1990). 
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In the 1970s the development of digital information technology led to a rapid proliferation 
of manufacturer-specific communication networks (Abbate 1999, 149). Because 
communication between these networks was difficult, if not impossible, the obvious path 
was to develop generic, uniform standards that would not only facilitate digital 
communication as a global mass service but also create an international market for 
information technology. Whereas standard-setting in telecommunications was a state or 
intergovernmental responsibility until the privatization of telephony in the 1990s, 
numerous private initiatives for standardization emerged to compete with ITU. The 
standardization of data networks was affected as well. Before ITU set out to develop 
appropriate standards in the early 1980s, a group of engineers supported by research 
funding from the US Department of Defense had formed and had begun addressing the 
problem of ‘internetworking’. The network architecture that grew out of this endeavour 
prevailed over the ITU model and makes up today’s Internet. The engineers involved in the 
development of the Internet formed the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1986. 
The IETF is still a ‘loosely self-organized group of people who contribute to the 
engineering and evolution of Internet technologies’ (Hoffman 2006) and it has no formal 
legal status or formal organizational boundaries. In the 1990s the open community of 
engineers went on to become the most important standardization platform for the 
expanding Internet industry. 
The Internet’s nongovernmental origin has had an enduring impact on both network 
architecture and administrative structure. Unlike territorially organized national network 
architectures of the telecommunications world, the Internet is global. That is, it does not 
consist of national, autonomous networks; it constitutes a uniform global address space. 
Many observers initially acclaimed the borderless architecture of the communication 
network as a welcome liberation from state control and national tariffing. But dispensing 
with territorial national structures has serious implications for regulatory policy. The 
Internet addresses and the Domain Name System, two resources essential to the operation 
of the network in its current form, are subject to supervision by one single country. The 
design of the Internet thus also violates the traditional ‘interface solutions’ typical of 
intergovernmental telecommunication policy (see Hofmann 2007). The global architecture 
of the Internet raises questions of regulatory authority. Who or what legitimizes the 
enforcement of global rules and standards? 
Initially, responsibility for administering the Internet’s name and addressing systems went 
to the engineers who had developed the Internet. The delegation of top-level domains and 
the allocation of Internet addresses, for instance, were up to one person who had the 
confidence of the IETF. The net’s private coordination structures proved successful until 
the mid-1990s. Rule-setting by technical experts hit its limits after the Internet was opened 
to private users, at which time its growth rate and degree of commercialization soared. 
Domain names, which had until then been considered a public resource, became assets 
with high speculative value. At the same time, claims to ownership of domain names were 
asserted. The first legal disputes over domain names occurred in 1994. An informal 
secondary market for domain names evolved, which caused uncertainty among the 
unfolding Internet commerce. Another problem arose from the administrative structure of 
the Domain Name System. Although many observers argued for creating additional top-
level domains and launching a competitive delegation and registration system, the private 
coordination structures no longer had enough clout to take legitimate action on such goals. 
In the end, the IETF’s attempt to protect its regulatory function by integrating trademark 
associations and international organizations failed when the US government objected. In 
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the course of 1997, the US Commerce Department intervened in the growing authority 
conflicts and henceforth assumed responsibility for negotiating a new regulatory model for 
the infrastructure of the Internet. 
The US government adopted the popular idea of creating stability and order on the Internet 
through private forms of coordination. In cooperation with the US Commerce Department, 
a private nonprofit organization, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), was created in 1998. A Memorandum of Understanding between the 
US government and ICANN laid down the division of responsibilities between them and a 
schedule for the foreseen privatization of those responsibilities. The US government 
delegated the administration of the Domain Name System, including the introduction of 
regulated competition in the domain name market and the allocation of Internet addresses, 
to ICANN. The Memorandum of Understanding also established that regulatory measures 
affecting the market for domain names were to be developed consensually by all 
participating actors representing interests of business and civil society (the bottom-up 
principle). Business organizations and Internet users were expected to negotiate solutions 
to market problems on the basis of self-regulation.
However, the intended privatization of the Internet’s administration, first scheduled to take 
place two years after ICANN was created, has still not come about. The US government 
has repeatedly extended its contractually based supervisory function, also moving away 
from the idea of total privatization politically. The private structures of self-regulation have 
obviously not achieved the levels of efficiency, certainty, and legitimacy expected of them, 
though the change in the international security situation may also have been a factor in the 
US government’s about-face. 
The reconsideration and delay of the projected privatization has become the subject of a 
protracted multi-level negotiations not only between ICANN and the US government but 
also among various governments and intergovernmental organizations. Since the 2003 UN 
World Summit on the Information Society, the international community of nations has 
sought to enlarge its part in this negotiation process. Some actors regard the Internet 
Governance Forum, an outcome of the World Summit set up by the UN, as a suitable 
vehicle for holding ICANN accountable to a broader public outside the United States. 
Where ICANN had interpreted the growing intergovernmental concern as a threat and 
additional source of uncertainty, it has now made efforts to cooperate with the UN. The 
relation between public and private actors in Internet regulation is thus not heading 
unidirectionally towards increased authority of the private sector. Instead, we observe an 
oscillation between private and public dominance. 
The transnational regulation of corporate accounting 
Companies quoted on the stock exchange give account of their economic activities in the 
annual reports they are legally required to publish. These balance sheets are primarily 
supposed to inform shareholders, but they are also directed to public actors: the interested 
public, the workforce, and their representatives. The standards for the preparation of these 
reports, whose technical accuracy must be checked by independent certified public 
accountants, are laid down in various national laws and follow from the listing 
requirements of stock exchanges. The intensifying international activity of companies, the 
significance of foreign subsidiaries, and the mobility of invested capital across frontiers 
raise the demands of transparency on companies, which are increasingly competing with 
each other over investment capital. One way to reduce the uncertainty for companies and 
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investors resulting from the contradictions and complex challenges is to harmonize 
accounting standards, the expectation being that doing so would facilitate transnational 
economic activity as well. 
The international harmonization of rules on preparing and presenting balance sheets also 
poses a challenge to national regulations because accounting standards are embedded in a 
web of laws and practices related to economic policy. Accounting standards are not just 
abstractions guiding the way the balance sheet should be dealt with. They express national 
institutional realities, such as specific forms of corporate capitalization, specifics of tax 
policy, and the role of associations. In addition, one may regard accounting standards as 
yardsticks of social power relations governing the distribution of economic benefits 
(Hopwood 1990). Economic systems that focus on investors, as they do chiefly in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, have a strong shareholder orientation. Economic systems in 
continental Europe, by contrast, have long been dominated by a culture of compromise 
between different social groups. Actors in Europe have practised forms of coordinated 
problem-solving that concentrate on the long term and take a large pool of social actors 
into consideration. This arrangement is a stakeholder orientation (see also comparative 
research on capitalism by Hall and Soskice 2001). 
To simplify transnational economic activities, one can envisage different ways of 
standardizing national rules for accounting and for preparing and presenting balance sheets 
(Samuels and Piper 1985). These approaches to harmonization vary in the kind and depth 
of regulation, ranging from mutual acceptance of national corporate balance sheets to the 
use of worldwide identical accounting standards intended to lead to uniform reporting. 
Historically, there have been both international and private efforts at regulation designed to 
unify accounting standards across borders (Botzem and Quack 2006). These different 
projects have competed with each other and with received national standards embodying 
different socioeconomic modes of dealing with uncertainty. 
From today’s perspective, a private organization that began producing accounting 
standards more than 30 years ago has decided this regulatory competition in its own favour 
The London-based International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)2 has been 
responsible for standardization since the 1970s but has also greatly changed in the past 
decades (for a detailed history of the IASB, see Camfferman and Zeff 2007). Contrary to 
today’s occasionally prevailing viewpoint that the road to acceptance of the IASB was 
straight and clear, closer inspection reveals that the organization’s establishment and 
recognition was a volatile and contested process whose outcome was uncertain until just a 
few years ago. On the whole, the regime of private standardization overseen by the IASB 
is marked by strong private–public interaction. The institutional structures, regulatory 
content, procedures, and forms of participation have been subject to sometimes 
considerable change and are in perpetual development. 
Accounting practitioners have been the IASB’s determining actor groups from the outset. 
Formally, its origins go back to 1973, the year in which national associations of certified 
public accountants from nine countries came together to work on devising transnational 
standards. Anglo-Saxon associations and IASB experts dominated from the start. They laid 
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 Until 2001, this standardization body was officially called the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC). For clarity’s sake, however, only the current name (IASB) is used in the present text, 
though important organizational changes were made during the transition from the IASC to the IASB in 
2001. 
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the foundation for a pluralistic understanding of self-regulation, one that stressed the 
advantages of efficient, private standard-setting over cumbersome regulation by 
governments. Over time, though, the business sector’s influence soared, especially that of 
global auditing firms (Cooper and Robson 2006; Botzem 2008). For a long time, the IASB 
was a meta-organization (Ahrne and Brunsson 2005) whose members were not persons but 
national associations. It was from their ranks that individuals from various professional 
backgrounds were delegated for the work on transnational standardization. 
Professional associations, especially those in Anglo-Saxon countries, are dominated by 
experts whose work centres on the practical activity of bookkeeping, accounting, and 
auditing. The major significance that the capital market traditionally has in these countries 
makes the informational bearing of corporate reports a core element whose objectivity is 
guaranteed primarily by auditing firms. These companies check for appropriate application 
of the accounting standards and ultimately attest to the correctness of the information. In 
practice, the auditing companies cooperate closely with the companies they audit. These 
business connections are not confined to checking and certifying the balance sheet for the 
fiscal year. They also encompass consulting and service activities, which were mixed up in 
and partly responsible for the business scandals of the past years in the United States and 
elsewhere (Eaton 2005). 
The auditing companies provide much of the expertise for the IASB’s work on 
transnational standardization and dominate the substantive development of the standards. 
Nevertheless, the expert-based standard-setting only partly explains International 
Accounting Standards’ (IAS) global diffusion. The gradual elaboration of a comprehensive 
catalogue of accounting regulations did meet the necessary condition for private 
transnational standard-setting, namely, the production of rules that can be complied with. 
That outcome alone, though, cannot explain the spread and recognition of IAS as the 
applicability of international standards is determined by national laws. Another factor was 
that the stock exchanges in some countries led the way, enhancing the legitimacy of IAS 
by availing themselves of the opportunity to publish IAS-based balance sheets voluntarily. 
But the crucial reason for the eventual adoption of IAS and for the IASB’s recognition as 
the producer of quasi-binding standards was an agreement with national and supranational 
actors. 
State regulatory policies and public support by private actors were essential to the binding 
introduction of IAS. However, the recognition of IAS leaves public actors with less 
manoeuvering room than they would gain with the national standardization of accounting 
methods. Public actors must recognize and recommend IAS, vesting the IASB with public 
authority has buttressed the position of private experts, whose judgments are highly 
regarded in the political discourse. In the following sections we compare and evaluate the 
individual phases of development in setting the standards of corporate accounting and 
allocating addresses on the Internet. 
Forms of private–public interaction in transnational regulation 
As different as the two realms of regulation may seem at first glance, there are a number of 
processes they conspicuously have in common. Among other things, these processes have 
to do with the changing role of the state and private actors and with the reconfiguration of 
the relationship between private and public actors of standard-setting. Over time, two sets 
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of dynamics have become apparent. Firstly, comparison shows private and public 
contention for predominance as transnationalization desseminates into processes of 
regulation and private institutions such as standards. Secondly, cross-border activities lead 
to changes in the substance of regulation. To illustrate these dynamics, we outline the 
courses of standardization processes in four stages for both the cases presented in this 
article. The phases we differentiate are to be understood as empirically observable, but 
ideal-typical, composites of the corresponding developments. 
Inception of self-regulation 
The tradition of the Internet’s self-regulation owes not least to the disinterest of 
government authorities in the former research network that gave rise to today’s Internet. 
Although the development of the technical standards constituting the Internet was funded 
by the US Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency, that organization 
claimed no influential role in either the process of development or the coordination of the 
network infrastructure. The structures of self-regulation that framed the development of 
standards and the administration of the Internet arose from the immediate need of the 
engineers who operated the experimental data network. Within the 15 years or so between 
the commencement of research funding and the privatization of the network infrastructure, 
informal practices of norm-setting became fixed as official institutions and routines. Some 
of them still exist (see Mueller and Thompson 2004), one being the Requests for 
Comments (RFC), which is the name for the IETF’s technical standards. The first RFC 
dates back to 1969 and was literally a request for comments. In subsequent years an 
increasingly formalized procedure for generating technical standards evolved. 
The editing and indexing of these standards was incumbent upon the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA, the institutional precursor of ICANN). IANA was also 
responsible for the allocation of Internet addresses and, after the Domain Name System 
had been implemented, for the delegation of top-level domains. For all its power, until the 
late 1990s IANA consisted essentially of one person acting on behalf of the engineering 
community: Jon Postel. As long as the Internet was the preserve of a small, exclusive 
community and as long as the range of the technical and administrative rule-setting seemed 
confined to that user group, an informal form of organization resting on personal trust was 
sufficient. It gained its legitimacy in the early phase of standard-setting by virtue of low 
participation thresholds and efficient, application-oriented standard setting processes. The 
demands on the legal character and legitimacy of the standard-setting procedures changed 
when the Internet became a global mass medium and the importance of technical and 
procedural rules grew. 
In the field of corporate accounting, the early years of transnational standard-setting were 
marked by the swift and steady elaboration of IAS. Those of the 1970s and 1980s, though, 
were not precise accounting standards; they were adopted from the existing national 
systems and recompiled. These additively developed standards tended to be normative 
guidelines whose purpose was to make the different national rules comparable (Thorell and 
Whittington 1994). Because the early standards were set up voluntarily and aimed at 
winning majority support, transparency and participation were of secondary importance. 
The need to harmonize accounting rules was discussed above all by the professionals 
working for global auditing companies (Samuels and Piper 1985). Anglo-Saxon founders 
set the agenda of these debates. They were closely tied to large service businesses, whereas 
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many of the continental European representatives were self-employed persons or 
employees in small auditing firms (Camfferman and Zeff 2007). Involvement of company 
representatives was minimal in the early phase of standard-setting for accounting. The 
main actors were a small circle of professional accountants who performed the audits, 
represented associations, and maintained transnational contacts all in one (Tamm 
Hallström 2004). Anglo-Saxon practices were followed in the IASB from an early point 
on. Governmental representatives, especially from developing countries, played little or no 
part (Hopwood 1994; Rahman 1998). 
In both cases the early phase of the development of transnational standards reflected the 
great emphasis that the participating actors put on practical matters. Self-regulation at that 
juncture in the process meant the search for immediate solutions to problems with cross-
border cooperation and coordination. Sharing objectives and values across their 
professional cultures, Internet pioneers, national professional associations, and practising 
certified public accountants worked together without having to keep government 
authorities, user organizations, or other external interests in mind. Through direct impact, 
they ensured the participation of people who were affected and could count on public 
support, provided they did not compete with governmental actors. In both cases, the germ 
of private transnational standard-setting was a small, self-determined group of experts who 
knew each other through practical collaboration and who framed problems and goals in the 
same way. The orientation towards relevant experts permitted and warranted the exclusive 
character of the standard-setting projects. 
Limits of private self-regulation 
Aided by government funding, yet largely free of government intervention, the IETF 
created a cluster of technical, social, and administrative standards that effectively regulated 
the Internet and its use until the mid 1990s. An academic culture of personal responsibility 
and sharing of what were regarded as public computing and network resources were 
formative aspects of the IETF’s ideas about administering the Internet. As long as the 
Internet was a research network reserved almost exclusively for academic research 
institutions, its users broadly accepted this culture of common welfare and its behavioural 
institutions (‘netiquette’). 
But the composition of the users changed quickly after privatization of the infrastructure, 
and the IETF’s power to define the technical and administrative standards of the Internet 
began to erode. The decline of the IETF’s authority became especially evident in disputes 
over title to domain names. In 1994 Jon Postel still declared self-confidently that ‘concerns 
about “rights” and “ownership” of domains are inappropriate. It is appropriate to be 
concerned about “responsibilities” and “service” to the community’ (Postel 1994). This 
view, which indisputably reflected majority opinion in the IETF, collided increasingly with 
the interests of the expanding electronic commerce, which was out to protect its claims to 
ownership of trade marks both off- and online. Flaring conflicts of interest showed that the 
engineering community was no longer acting on behalf of all Internet users and that the 
hitherto unquestioned link between technical and social authority of norm-setting was 
losing acceptance. 
The IETF and its legal holding organization, the Internet Society (founded in 1992), 
responded to the pluralization of interests on the Internet by striving to integrate them. 
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Offers to cooperate were made, particularly to the intellectual property organizations and 
the competing intergovernmental standardization organization, the ITU. In 1996 the IETF 
created an ‘Internet International Ad Hoc Committee’ to rearrange the coordination 
structures of the Domain Name System. One of the goals was also to replace hitherto 
existing monopolies in the Domain Name System by creating new top-level domains and 
bringing in competition in registration services.  
The proposals submitted by the International Ad Hoc Committee in 1997 drew heavy 
criticism from actors who felt their interests ignored. The heaviest fire came from the 
opponents of trademark interests, who argued against privileging intellectual property 
rights to the Domain Name System.3 Consequently, the engineering community saw its 
regulatory authority defied by the reproach of favouritism. The effort to integrate 
vociferous critics as partners-in-cooperation had only exacerbated the problem of 
representation that had arisen on the Internet. The rapid expansion of the net resulted in a 
growing sectoral and regional heterogeneity of user groups, complicating endeavours to 
develop consensual regulatory standards. The community of technical experts lost its 
dominant position and developed into one of several expert groups intent on having a voice 
in the further development of the Internet. 
In the case of corporate accounting, the early years of standard-setting were marked by 
considerable output. The IASB developed and adopted 22 general standards in its first 
decade, though they did need to be honed. The IASB therefore gradually broadened its 
external contacts and tried to initiate the introduction of IAS by businesses and stock 
exchanges. Still shaped and dominated by Anglo-Saxon experts, the professional culture 
revolved largely around the needs of actors on the capital market. Cooperative relations 
were thus sought with international organizations such as the OECD and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (Nobes and Parker 2004: 82). 
Recognition by third parties proved to be a significant element in the continued 
development of international standards. Despite the significance attributed to the 
recognition of IAS by private actors such as stock exchanges, financial institutions, and 
businesses, the government’s positive sanction was essential. Legislation or government-
authorized national standard-setters had to make IAS mandatory, or at least had to tolerate 
them. 
Despite the IASB’s early recognition of the need to network with other actors, and despite 
the organization’s systematic quest to integrate and co-opt key private and public actors 
since the 1980s, the actual work on standardization was mainly influenced by national 
professional associations and practitioners from international accounting firms. 
Standardization has been dominated by a professional culture in which rational 
argumentation about the ‘best technical solution’ is highly valued. However, it continues to 
be a political process in which actors intend to influence the content of standards (Botzem 
and Quack 2006). It includes the systematic integration of international organizations (e.g., 
the OECD, the World Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, 
Switzerland) as well as critical actors (e.g., US regulatory authorities, the Commission of 
the European Union, and IOSCO). To guarantee the financial foundation and practical 
application of IAS, it was important to be open to the concerns of multinational 
corporations, financial market analysts, and global auditing firms. The simultaneous 
integration of international organizations and the cooptation or private actor groups assured 
                                                
3 Among other things, the Ad Hoc Committee had suggested a waiting period for registering domain names 
so that they could first be checked for violations of trademark law. 
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the recognition of IAS and support by the IASB. The price for this inclusion was 
adaptation of the standards to the interests of capital markets and assent to political 
concessions, especially when it came to the US standard-setter, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB).4 Integrating the associations of financial market analysts and 
financial executives into the IASB’s decision-making bodies provided for orientation to the 
capital market. It also promoted the willingness to abide by privately generated rules 
(Tamm Hallström 2004: 152). 
In both cases examined here, the second phase of transnational standard-setting has been 
marked by pluralization that pushes non-binding private self-regulation to its limits. One 
reason for the escalation of external influence is the increasing economic and political 
relevance of standardization activities. The Internet’s success has brought about a kind of 
collision between intellectual property rights on the one hand and the institutions 
governing the allocation of infrastructure resources, particularly domain names, and the 
interaction of the engineering community on the other. Moreover, the standards and rules 
of both standard setting organizations did win the acceptance of everyone involved but did 
not suffice for universal recognition beyond organizational boundaries. In the case of 
corporate accounting, national laws virtually prevented the standards from spreading. In 
both areas, economic and political interests of third parties therefore had to be tied into 
transnational norm-setting. The involved professionals and their associations at first 
invoked the neutrality and objectivity of their professional cultures and rejected 
‘inappropriate’ intervention. Nonetheless, they opened their norm-setting projects to 
selected economic and public actors. The US government proved itself to be a particularly 
powerful entity in both cases, one whose recognition of the two projects was bought only 
with major concessions. 
The integration sought by private actors illustrates the contestation prevailing in 
transnational institution-building. As the rules and standards become ever more precise and 
binding, the private organizations pursuing standardization begin competing with existing 
rules and regulatory authorities. The integration and cooptation of critical actors are the 
attempt to respond to these conflicts. The integrative activities point to the innate 
weaknesses of private rulemaking. Although pooling pertinent expertise enables private 
actors to formulate rules, they lack the leverage to get them accepted and applied. A 
‘hybridization’ of private standard-setting initiatives thereby comes about, a process 
characterized by a growing interaction and cooperation between private and public actors. 
The differences between the integration strategies illustrated in the two empirical cases can 
be explained in terms of the specific contexts of action that frame transnational standard-
setting. With corporate accounting, it was obvious that a binding acceptance of IAS would 
require their recognition by public actors. With the Internet in the mid 1990s, however, it 
was uncertain who had to be won over as a cooperation partner in order to gain binding 
acceptance of regulatory rules for the Internet’s Domain Name System (Hofmann 2005). 
                                                
4
 Paradoxically, the FASB has had observer status since 1990, although IAS have never been recognized in 
the United States. The FASB’s observer status is due primarily to the influence wielded by the US financial 
markets. The United States long emphasized the superiority of its own standards, declaring them the ultimate 
yardstick of information needs. Behind this stance is the FASB’s domestic political power and a fundamental 
American refusal to bow to international rules. The accounting scandals at the end of the New Economy 
bubble (e.g., Enron and Worldcom; see Eaton 2005) and ensuing regulation, however, have raised the odds 
that IAS will spread in the United States. Intense negotiations about introducing IAS for foreign joint-stock 
corporations listed on US stock exchanges are in progress. 
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The engineering community expected to gain additional legitimacy by internationalizing 
the rule-setting. That idea turned out to be a miscalculation. 
State authorization of private self-regulation 
In the course of 1997, the US government officially intervened in the ongoing discussion 
of future regulation of the Internet, declaring that it had political jurisdiction over its 
infrastructure by virtue of the public research funding that had gone into its development. 
In order to press this claim on the regulatory authority, the state first needed technical 
control over the more or less privately operated core of the Domain Name System, the 
authoritative root server, the operation of which the National Science Foundation had 
delegated to a private company a few years earlier. Only after the US government had 
established its political supervision of the technical root of the Internet’s name space could 
it delegate that function back to the private sector (see Mueller 2002). 
The US Department of Commerce announced its intention to create a global private 
and contractual regime for the Domain Name System and publicly requested comments on 
the idea. In effect, the US government entered into direct competition with private 
regulatory initiatives such as the International Ad Hoc Committee that had originated in 
the environs of the engineering community and that involved subsidiary UN organizations 
such as the ITU and the World Intellectual Property Organization. In 1998, the US 
government formally recognized ICANN in a Memorandum of Understanding as a private 
body for the coordination of the Domain Name System and commissioned it to create a 
market for the registration of domain names and set rules for the creation of additional top-
level domains. Hence, the US government interjected itself into a largely private weave of 
coordination with the official objective of privatizing it. This procedure’s inherent 
contradiction became even clearer in subsequent years, when it turned out that the 
government’s supervisory function would not end within two years as planned at the 
outset. Today, nearly a decade after ICANN was founded, complete privatization of the 
network infrastructure's regulatory structure seems less likely than in the late 1990s, when 
the optimism about private self-regulation was considerably greater. The embedding of 
private regulation in a contractual system of control by one individual government affects 
only regulatory standard-setting.5
In the case of corporate accounting, the IASB has been successfully recognized for 
the most part thanks to the integration and cooptation of prominent private and public 
organizations. This expansive strategy has clearly demonstrated the limits of the board’s 
functionality. Both standard-setting and the enlarged scope of consulting led to 
fundamental structural reform of the IASB in 2000, another step towards final acceptance 
and legitimation of private work on standardization. The European Commission (EC) 
mandated the introduction of IAS with an EC regulation, paving the way for the 
dissemination of international accounting standards throughout the world. This decision 
was taken out of weakness, though, for the project the European Union (EU) had on 
developing its own standards for harmonizing the single market had failed. Instead of 
doing nothing other than watch European companies turn to US standards, the EU decided 
to recognize individual standards after reviewing them. The Commission believed this step 
                                                
5
 The Internet’s engineering community has resisted long-term entanglement with governments. Despite the 
creation of ICANN, for instance, the IETF has been able to retain its autonomy in setting technical standards. 
This is mainly because the technical standards of the IETF are not mandatory. Instead, the IETF pursues a 
‘let the market decide’ approach. 
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to be the only way to counter the unique position of the United States and its capital 
markets. Moreover, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 had strengthened the 
IASB (Martinez-Diaz 2005). Thorough reform of the organization created the procedures 
and legitimacy required for gaining the acceptance of IAS (Botzem 2008). With the 
adoption of EC regulation 1606/2002, the EU made IAS binding in its member states, 
committing 8,000 businesses to use them in the preparation of their balance sheets. 
In both cases, formal recognition of private standard-setting initiatives was a pivotal 
element of government involvement. Making privately developed rules obligatory was one 
last step in the diffusion of private standards. In doing so, the public actors were obviously 
pursuing their own interests. On the one hand, they were partly about foreign policy and 
centred on defending spheres of influence (with the EU keen on preventing US domination 
of accounting, and the US government bent on preventing the internationalization or multi-
lateralization of regulatory authority for the Internet). On the other hand, public interests 
also revolved around regulatory policy itself (pushing through market mechanisms in the 
Domain Name System and aligning accounting rules with the information needs of capital 
markets). At the same time, government authorization of private self-regulation implied a 
move away from traditional forms of intergovernmental regulation. Closer cooperation 
between private and public actors meant that disputes between public and private authority 
shifted into the regulatory arrangement. 
Limits of private self-regulation authorized by the government 
Since its inception, ICANN has created a market for registering domain names and has 
established an international arbitration procedure, so trademark law is now largely 
respected in the Domain Name System. For the generic top-level domain space such .org 
or .com, ICANN's regulatory rules and standards are mandatory. Domain name holders as 
well as commercial registrars and registries are contractually obliged to comply with them. 
Even the introduction of new top-level domains is gradually approaching, though no 
serious competition to the most popular top-level domain ‘.com’ has emerged yet. At first 
glance, then, the private regulatory regime seems to have met general expectations. 
Nevertheless, the US government has so far decided against complete privatization and 
steadfastly holds to state supervision of ICANN for an unlimited period. 
Leaving aside the changed security situation since 9/11 and domestic policy 
considerations, there are at least two other reasons that the supervisory relationship 
between the US government and ICANN has persisted. One has to do with deficient 
effectiveness and efficiency; the other, with a concomitant lack of legitimacy of the self-
regulation model. Private self-regulation has failed to prove more flexible and efficient 
than comparable state measures. For example, ICANN’s bottom-up process for building 
consensus has repeatedly foundered on the participants’ lack of willingness to compromise. 
Notorious bones of contention concern the creation of new top-level domains or (nationally 
varying) data-protection regulations pertaining to domain name registration. Issues of 
legitimation arise primarily when ICANN imposes contractually binding regulative rules 
(Hunter 2003). The grounds for legitimating unilateral control of the network infrastructure 
is being challenged not only by the regulatory parties directly affected but also by states 
and international organizations. Some countries and intergovernmental organizations, 
including the EU, have meanwhile argued for setting up an intergovernmental process by 
which to agree on general public policy principles for regulating the Internet. Only the 
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practical aspects of acting on them is to be left to private operators (see the Tunis Agenda 
2005 for the results of the UN World Summit on the Information Society). ICANN has 
responded to such threats of its status by formalizing its policy development and 
consultation processes, introducing accountability provisions and by making its decision 
making procedures more transparent (Koppell 2005). 
One may currently assume that public actors will keep trying to affect the regulation of the 
Internet both nationally and internationally. Complete internationalization based on the 
traditional model of telecommunications is very unlikely, however. More probable is the 
establishment of a rough division of labour between public authority including a 
commitment to principles of the common welfare and private, contractual self-regulation. 
The successful propagation of private accounting standards also draws criticism as does the 
legal requirement to apply them. Resistance is mounting, especially in Europe, where IAS 
have not only complemented but have sometimes already replaced national standards. It 
focuses on the IASB’s questionable accountability (Véron 2007). The most pressing 
controversy so far has been about mandating the use of particular financial instruments 
(IAS 39 Financial Instruments). In that dispute, national actors were not willing to adopt 
transnational rules. In the end, parts of the rules governing international standards were 
suspended within the EU; with certain individual terms eventually being ‘carved out’ of 
the overall package (Botzem 2008). On the whole, politicization of transnational standard-
setting of corporate accounting has increased lately. With Washington continuing to play 
out its powerful position, the European Commission in Brussels has intensified its 
endeavours to sway the IASB (Martinez-Diaz 2005). But direct impact on specific 
regulatory matters, as in the case of IAS 39, is rare and meets with open repudiation from 
IASB practitioners. The EU Commission is striving to engage itself more in the production 
of standards than it has in the past and is seeking to augment its veto power. However, the 
Commission depends on cooperation with private actors such as associations, businesses, 
analysts, and auditing firms, whose practical expertise and diverse resources remain 
independent wellsprings of influence. 
State authorization of private regulatory jurisdiction has raised new problems of 
legitimation in both accounting and Internet regulation. Private standard-setting agencies 
are criticized for favouritism; insufficient orientation to the common welfare; and lack of 
transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability. In other words, private standards face 
normative requirements that resemble those of public regulatory agencies. When formal 
private institutions acquire binding character, the originating organizations are measured 
according to the same kind of democratic procedures that apply to public decision-making. 
Self-regulated organizations are resorting more and more to democratic procedural ideals 
and forms of legitimation in order to gain acceptance and ensure their survival. Both 
ICANN and the IASB have undertaken extensive reform designed to bolster trust and 
confidence in private forms of standard-setting. In recent years, for example, ICANN has 
multiplied its provisions relating to accountability. The IASB subjects its standardization 
procedures to formal criteria of openness and participation. Aside from the fact that many 
of these measures are prone to be symbolic, it is unlikely that they will convince public 
actors to relinquish their veto power permanently. One can more readily assume that the 
oscillation between private and public standard-setting authority will continue and that the 
governance arrangements intended to increase the level of certainty at the international 
level will therefore keep developing. 
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Mechanisms of transnational institution-building 
The two transnational regulatory arrangements examined in this article stem from the need 
to reduce uncertainty through cross-border coordination. The initiative came from private 
actors pursuing special interests. They were, so to speak, thereby acting in the shadow of 
state authority – by and large unnoticed or not considered relevant objects of regulation. 
That situation changed as the political and economic significance of privately generated 
rules grew, particularly as their competition with existing standards intensified. The 
regulatory regimes began to expand beyond the narrow circle of experts and practitioners 
and to impinge on the interests of other parties. Both the ‘enlightened monarchy’ of the 
Internet’s engineering community and the accounting standard-setters had to allow the 
participation of other actors yet tried to uphold their normative fundamentals and to 
perpetuate their independence as private rule-setters. Although the practical work of setting 
standards still takes place among experts, it is hard to imagine that the results would 
prevail without the acceptance and support of government regulatory authorities. 
Regulation’s focus, too, changed over time. Internet regulation at first centred on allocation 
and delegation of resources such as numerical addresses and top-level domains. After 
existing allocation procedures came under criticism, technical and economic standard 
setting activities were separated (the creation of ICANN) and the latter area shifted to the 
formulation of rules for setting rules that would govern the emerging market for domain 
names. Likewise, the IETF has undergone a reflexive turn of formalization of decision-
making processes bearing on the setting of technical standards. As for corporate 
accounting, standardization was initially conceived to facilitate comparability between 
various regulatory jurisdictions but has moved more and more towards becoming a 
uniform catalogue of standards whose worldwide application is oriented to the 
informational needs of actors operating globally on financial markets. These changes were 
by no means free of conflict. In the area of accounting, however, the use of what is often a 
formalized, technocratic procedure to channel differences between interests and thereby to 
underscore the effectiveness and flexibility of private regulation has succeeded more 
convincingly than in Internet regulation. 
Comparison between projects of standardization in corporate accounting and allocation of 
Internet addresses shows that configurations of actors and the substance of regulation 
continually change and go through ceaseless renegotiation by public and private actors. It 
also reveals that the course of these developments is anything but inconsistent or erratic. 
The dynamics in these two case studies recognizably cluster into what we regard as phases. 
Private actors attempt to mobilize government support when the regulatory authority of 
their transnational coordination projects hits limits. However, state authorization of private 
self-regulation also proves to be a temporary solution, for the acceptance and effectiveness 
of these arrangements go only so far. To pursue self-initiated coordination projects and 
remain somewhat independent from government interests, the formerly private 
arrangements tend to take on procedures and principles typically associated with state 
organizations, including formal decision-making processes that offer transparency and 
ways to involve external groups. 
Despite empirical differences between the two cases, the dynamics of private self-
regulation indicate the tension between private and public actors. Private actors primarily 
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bring what they regard as neutral expertise to regulatory contexts. They seek to transform 
them into objective inventories of knowledge in order to increase compliance and thereby 
structure decisions and exert control in an altogether uncertain transnational environment. 
Public actors wield their authority to promote recognition of private arrangements, linking 
their authorization to an accommodation of their interests. A historical perspective shows 
that it becomes increasingly difficult to separate public and private practices of rule-
setting. This convergence is another source feeding the dynamics in both fields of 
regulation. 
The observed oscillating motion in the configurations of actors poses the question about 
explanations that might be generalizable beyond the two case studies. Based on this 
comparison we derive three explanatory mechanisms that help explain the dynamic 
development from privately coordinated efforts to projects designed to create binding 
global standardization. We define these three mechanisms as integration and closure, 
authorization, and proceduralization. 
Integration and closure  
In the eyes of the involved actors, working on transnational self-regulation was about 
increasing certainty by entrenching their technical expertise, shared orientations, and 
qualitative norms and about firmly establishing autonomy pertaining to the definition of 
recognized knowledge. The main goal was to define and delimit professional expertise. As 
at the national level (Abbot 1988), such demarcation determines affiliation and social 
status among experts interacting in the transnational realm. The emphasis on practical 
experience privileges experts who earn, or have earned, money at companies that profit 
from transnational standard-setting. It rewards the experts for their engagement in 
transnational standardization. Having specific expertise and practical experience is 
important for participation in transnational standard-setting. It sets the group of experts 
apart, for example from competing standard-setting bodies, and shields them from external 
influences such as political bargaining. However, defending professional autonomy 
conflicts with efforts to win recognition of the standards and their global diffusion. 
From the experts’ point of view, the challenge lay in both protecting their autonomy and 
coming to terms with the effects of their efforts, the continuing pluralization of interests. 
Put in neo-institutional terms, transnational standards aimed at reducing uncertainty will 
inevitably lead to new forms of uncertainty. The experts responded by co-opting actors 
who were sympathetic to their goals, who could furnish material and non-material 
resources to their project, and who promised to legitimatize their activities (see Black 
2008: 147 for the notion of legitimacy communities). At the same time, public actors 
rushed into private standard-setting in order to assert interests of their own. Determining 
the access to and participation in transnational standard-setting became a central 
component of coping with uncertainty in transnational self-regulation (see Grande 2006: 
90-92 on the issue of participation and membership). Control of this involvement comes 
through mechanisms of integration and closure. But embedding private standard-setting in 
the mesh of international organizations and associations eventually politicized the bodies 
of experts and their professional expertise. Ultimately, the IASB has been able to assert its 
norm-setting autonomy better than ICANN, whose authority to act is as yet only delegated. 
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Authorization 
Another mechanism facilitating the embedding of private standard-setting in government-
dominated organizational structures is the authorization of self-regulating bodies and their 
standards. Implementing privately generated rules and making them binding is the eye of 
the needle through which private actors can pass only with the help of government 
influence. Even if standards generated by private actors are recognized by other private 
actors – often through contracts under civil law (as is the case with IAS that were 
recognized by national stock exchanges before there were any rules for introducing them)  
– private acceptance does not lead to mandatory provisions. Through processes of public 
recognition of standards or standard-setting organizations, the state can act as an agent that 
screens private standards for quality and orientation to the common welfare. It authorizes 
the results of private self-regulation and thus reduces uncertainty through expanding their 
scope and impact. Simultaneously, the state can set basic conditions defining the validity 
of standards and thereby negotiate potential distributional effects. Similar opportunities 
emerge when it comes to delegating tasks to private actors such as ICANN. As principal or 
supervisory agency, the state can define tasks and quality criteria and can establish 
reporting obligations and potential sanctions. Public actors do not take direct part in 
developing standards and regulatory measures, but they do have indirect affect on them. In 
both cases studied in this article, governments actively exploit this leverage. However, the 
scope for affecting private governance arrangements is unequally distributed. Frequently, 
government approval of standards focuses on preventing undesired measures. Few public 
actors are powerful enough to succeed at aggressively asserting their own notions of 
policy. 
Proceduralization 
A third major mechanism in the dynamics of transnational regulation is the 
proceduralization of standard-setting. Both cases show a persistent trend towards the 
formalization of procedures and organizational structures. It appears, for instance, in the 
detailed codification of steps and sequences of standard-setting. Additional formalization is 
often a response to criticism from outsiders deploring a lack of balance, transparency, 
accountability, or opportunities to participate. Proceduralization is thus a pillar supporting 
the legitimation of transnational self-regulation. Functionally, their strength lies in the 
channelling of participation. In normative terms, however, participatory procedures convey 
the impression of openness and inclusiveness without necessarily measuring up to 
democratic standards of decision-making. Instead, they tie seamlessly into an expertise-
based understanding which considers openness to technical arguments an inherent quality. 
Criticism of private regulatory competence shows that private standard-setting is measured 
against qualitative criteria similar to those applied to national and international regulatory 
authorities. Private actors, too, are expected to respect recognized principles of equality 
before the law and the orientation to common welfare. The mechanism of 
proceduralization figures prominently in attempts to meet external concerns about the 
legitimacy of private standard-setting. Public actors take part in the procedures as critics 
(e.g., the EU vis-à-vis the IASB) and as responsible supervisory bodies (e.g., the US 
government vis-à-vis ICANN). In both capacities public actors can stipulate that private 
standard-setting bodies must abide by the fundamental principles of due process, 
independence, accountability, and transparency. Conceivably, then, the diagnosed swings 
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between public and private rule-setting ironically amount to a convergence of structures 
and procedures of private and public actors for the sake of long-term survival. 
Conclusion: transnational institution-building as public interplay between private 
and public authority 
The relationship between public and private actors has been subject to various 
metaphorical images. Osborne and Gaebler’s boat metaphor has already been mentioned. 
Gunningham and Rees (1997: 397) evoke the image of ‘two partners in a mazy dance’ to 
make the point that private and public regulatory institutions are closely linked. 
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 24) compare ‘regulatory globalization’ to the tide of the 
sea: ‘Like the real tide it ebbs and flows. Unlike the real tide, the control of the these ebbs 
and flows is found not in celestial law but in the intricate struggles of actors as they seek to 
influence the tide.’ Other metaphors that have been used to illustrate the oscillating 
movement are the pendulum and the spiral (for the latter see also Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006: 379; Grande 2006: 100). While the pendulum suggests motions between 
fixed starting and end points, our comparison shows that the constellations of actors go 
through organizational and functional changes in the wake of negotiation processes. The 
image of the spiral seems to capture these transformations more aptly than that of a 
pendulum. However, all these metaphors share a sense of constant collective response to 
uncertainty. The dynamic character of transnational standardization points towards the 
need to explain how uncertainty is reduced and why each arrangement proves to be only 
temporarily stable. The oscillating motion described in this article reveals a twofold 
dynamic of transnational institution building. It relates to both the content of various 
regulatory measures as well as to the principles and modes of rule-setting between private 
and public. 
In summary, our observations boil down to the thesis that institution-building beyond the 
nation state does not follow the often predicted linear trends towards privatization or re-
regulation but rather leads to cooperative relations between private and public actors. 
Private actors usually contribute their expertise, whereas public actors are strong at 
mandating, implementing, and legitimating. Mattli (2003: 200) speaks of ‘joint 
governance’ and points to the tandem structure of transnational standardization between 
various jurisdictions. From our perspective, however, the observable developments in 
Internet regulation and corporate accounting even go beyond that insight. In both the cases 
examined in this article, the participants neither foresaw nor strove to divide the labour 
between private and public actors. The dynamics of transnational regulation emerge from 
the very circumstance that private and public actors alike are perpetually wrestling for 
recognition of their respective competence, autonomy, authority, and legitimacy so as to 
reduce the uncertainty they face in transnational areas. In the medium term, this process 
ought to lead to a progressive proceduralization of standard-setting and to a convergence of 
public and private rationales of action.  
To be sure, stabilizing organizations and institutions have sprouted in the transnational 
realm. But the interplay of private and intergovernmental authority must be re-ignited 
constantly, making it a continual bone of contention, as shown by the course of the phases 
outlined in our two case studies. We refer to these dynamics as an oscillating motion (with 
a spiral twist) characterized by fluctuations between private and public leadership in the 
continued development of institution-building. While the initial uncertainty of cross-border 
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engagements was reduced through global standards, the transnational arrangements give 
rise to new uncertainties because perpetuated dynamics constantly bring about 
reconfigurations of public-private standardization. In addition, there is a potentially 
irreversible shift of levels towards transnational regulatory arrangements, which are 
decoupling more and more from procedures traditionally under national and democratic 
control. In practice, multi-level constellations linking national, state, and international 
private actors with each other arise in the regulatory areas analyzed in this article. 
For all the support furnished by the three mechanisms, however, the new ‘division of 
labour’ between private and public actors in transnational regulation cannot obscure the 
fact that the weight shifts between the government and the business community. The 
generation of rules and standards themselves is customarily reserved to private actors. In 
order to legitimate their claim to regulatory authority, they strive to increase the 
transparency and openness of their procedures. The strength of private authority can lie in 
greater compliance by third parties, provided that private self-regulation elicits increased 
advance trust among the organizations affected. Private authority in the area of Internet 
regulation lacks this strength, though, partly because ‘delegated authority’ has not afforded 
ICANN sufficient independence, partly because the policy field is very contested. 
In conclusion, the dynamics of formal transnational institution-building processes, 
especially their nonlinearity, deserve more attention than they have received up to now. By 
describing oscillations and referring to causal mechanisms, we take the unexpectedly clear 
parallels revealed by our comparison and try to condense them heuristically in a way that 
makes it possible to test their applicability in other areas of governance as well. Most of 
all, our study should be seen as a call to continue doing process analyses that helps 
improve the understanding of transnational institution-building. 
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